Barbosa, Booty, and God

"I feel....cold!" 

Barbosa stares blankly into the distance as he falls over and dies. The premise of the first Pirates movie is that Barbosa's crew had taken a piece of cursed gold. Now, they can't feel jack diddly squat. All the pleasures of life they normally enjoy are stripped-the crew feels nothing. That is, until Jack Sparrow drops the last piece of Aztec booty (and by booty I mean gold) in the chest. Boom. Barbosa's been shot and starts feeling again-and feels cold. And drops dead. 

Coldness
Today was a beautiful day outside-breezy. Last Friday, that was not the case. I was spending the night at Wheaton College, where it was rather cold. However, a dude from Hawaii was also there...he called the air "crisp". No joke. I kind of like that :)

What is sensation though? Think about it. When cold air hits my skin, the neurons in that area send a signal to the brain. But is the signal (or the resultant chemistry) identical to the sensation? I'm going to ask a weird question. Can you find coldness in the brain chemistry? Sure, you can find signals that correlate to the feeling of coldness...but can you find the sensation itself in the brain chemistry? Check this out: 

Leibniz Law
Who was Leibniz? Well, he's an old dead dude. But he came up with a lot of neat math stuff...you know, Calculus? He was one of the key people in advancing mathematics to the modern place. He was also a kick-butt philosopher. He came up with a very intuitive law called "Leibniz Law" (-_-). It goes like this:

Let A be some entity/property/process. A = whatever placeholder you want it to be.

If A = A, then whatever is true of A will be true of A. Shocked? It goes on.
If A = A, whatever is possibly true of A will be possibly true of A. Shocked yet? Just wait.

Really quick, we need to understand what philosophers mean by "possible worlds". Possible worlds are the way the world could have been, or the way the world may be. They are semantic tools for philosophers to describe possibility. So, for example, if I say "it's possible that in the future, I may buy a dog", I can say that because in my mind, that's a perfectly coherent scenario. That is, there is nothing internally contradictory about the possibility that I may buy a dog sometime in the future. Thus, because this is possible, there is a possible world where I own a dog. Let's make one more application. Suppose I say "it's possible that God exists." That's because I can envision that as a possible scenario in my mind, and there's nothing logically incoherent about that possibility (all attempts to prove God to be logically incoherent have been abject failures). Hence, there is a possible world where God exists. This is the essence of modal logic-the logic of possibilities. So let's apply that Leibniz Law. If A = God, whenever I talk about God, God must be God in all possible worlds (duh). I can't envision any non-God entity and call that God (duh). So here's what that means for Leibniz's Law:

If A = A, then whatever is true of A will be true of A.
If A = A, then whatever is possibly true of A will be possibly true of A.
If A = A, in all possible worlds, A will always be A.

This is intuitive enough. As a side note, if something is true in all possible worlds, it is necessarily true. That is to say that there is no other possible way it could have been. For example, take 1 + 1 = 2. We could have had any symbols we wanted to represent that, but as for the concept itself-one object plus another object equaling a consistent quantity of two objects-there is no other way the world could have been. One object could never have equaled two objects, etc. Back to Leibnuts, suppose you have A and B. If someone claims they are identical, then this is what should follow:

If A = B, whatever is true of A will be true of B
Whatever is possibly true of A will be possibly true of B
In all possible worlds, A = B

So this is where the fun begins :)

Back to Booty
When Barbosa wanted to steal the gold from the chest, he definitely felt excited. But think about this carefully: is the subjective experience identical to the brain stuff? Let's define mental state as MS, and brain state as BS (brain state being the grey stuff and the chemistry and whatnot). If MS = BS, then by Leibniz Law, whatever is true of MS should be true of BS. Is that true?

Well, put yourself in Barbosa's shoes and think of booty. And by booty I mean the chest. Form a mental image of it in your mind. So if it's true that your mental state IS a brain state (i.e is identical), then everything that is true of your MS should be true of the corresponding BS. However, we can note something interesting here: you won't find the mental picture in the brain chemistry. You don't find subjective sensation in the grey matter that corresponds to our experience. But that means there's something true of MS (namely, the property of subjective experience) that's not true of BS. Hence...MS ain't BS. Let me reiterate a few other arguments, and then flesh out the implications (this will be mainly a restatement of stuff I've written elsewhere on this blog): 

Idealism
As mentioned earlier, you won't find subjective experience in the brain chemistry. You will find correlates to subjective experience-perhaps dopamine or whatever. But you won't find the subjective experience itself. This is important to note. Philosophers call your subjective experience "qualia". Qualia are all subjective sensations you experience-knowledge, sensation of color, sensation of taste, etc. Any subjective sensation you have is qualia. So if everything that exists is fundamentally consciousness, it means that nothing exists outside of perception. If you think about it, we have no evidence that anything exists outside of perception-observing evidence itself requires the existence of perception (since the act of "observing" is an act of perceiving). This is the view I take. Most Christians are probably dualists-they believe that soul and body are fundamentally different. I don't. Though I'm not the only Christian to hold that view. What follows is a proof of idealism.

Why Idealism is Irrefutably true
The relevant points to keep in mind are these:
-Leibniz Law
-Subjective experience vs neurological correlates to subjective experience. What I mean by this is simply that there are certainly correlates to subjective experience in the brain. Thinking really hard results in higher brain activity. However, correlation does not equal causation, and causation doesn't equal identity. Let me discuss those points.

Suppose event X is correlated to event Y. If Y happens after X, that doesn't always mean that X caused Y. If my heater konks out after some dude moves in with me, that doesn't necessarily mean he's the reason the heater konked out. He could be, but he's not necessarily the reason. Also, if X and Y are causally linked, that doesn't imply that X is identical to Y. So if a chemical causes a certain subjective experience, that doesn't imply that that chemical is identical to that experience. If brain activity and consciousness are correlated (which they undeniably are), that doesn't imply that consciousness reduces to reactions going off inside your head.

In fact (and this is where Leibniz Law comes into play), it emphatically isn't. Leibniz had a thought experiment called "Leibniz mill". If you look into your brain, you'll see a lot of chemicals. You'll see electrical impulses. You will not see subjective experience. You will see the correlates to subjective experience. But you will not see the sensations themselves. So ask yourself, is consciousness identical to material processes going off inside your head? If it were, why is it that I cannot do neuroscience by pure introspection? As Sam Harris admits, "there's nothing about introspection (that is, closing your eyes and looking within) that leads you to sense that your subjectivity is at all dependent or even remotely related to voltage changes going off inside your head." If consciousness were identical to these processes, why is it that I do not have access to said electrical signals?

Some at this point will accuse me of committing the fallacy of composition. That is to say that I am taking what applies to the parts, and applying it to the whole. If consciousness is the result of a bunch of neurons going off, then what is true of consciousness won't be true of those individual neurons. However, the key thing to note about the fallacy of composition is that the parts don't just disappear. Take an airplane jet engine. It is true that there are things that are true of the airplane that aren't true of the jet engine. However, the parts of the airplane don't just disappear. The jet is still part of the airplane. However, if you do introspection, you will not find neurons anywhere. You won't find electrical signals. They practically vanish. Again, I am not suggesting that consciousness isn't correlated to brain activity. However, I am saying that it is not reducible to brain activity.

Let me illustrate this point further. Take Mary. Mary is a Color scientist who for whatever reason loves to study color. She lives in the future, where we have the whole brain mapped. She learns all the physical facts there are to know about how brains process color. She spends countless hours learning these facts. What's the catch? She's colorblind.

So though she knows all the physical facts there are to know about color, and about how the brain reacts when it perceives color, she has no idea what people actually see when they see "redness". She knows the correlates to redness, but she doesn't know what red looks like (because she's colorblind). What does that mean? It means that physical facts about the brain aren't identical to mental facts...and thus, there is something true of subjective experience that's not true of the physical facts surrounding that subjective experience. Hence, subjective experience-consciousness-is not reducible to brain chemistry.

David Chalmers, a philosopher of the mind, came up with a neat thought experiment. For all you know, I might be a meat bag reacting to electrical signals, but may have no subjective experience at all. I might say I do, but that's just my wiring causing me to say that. Really, I'm a zombie-what Chalmers calls a "p-zombie" (a philosophical zombie). I look and talk like you people with subjective experience, but I have none. Why does that matter? You can know all the physical facts about my brain, but that wouldn't prove I'm conscious. You cannot know what I'm subjectively experiencing without asking me about my subjective experience. Here's where Leibniz Law and modal logic come into play:

1.) It's possible that p-zombies exist (they are conceivable-I could be one for all you know)
2.) There is a possible world where p-zombies exist. (Modal possibility)
3.) You could learn all the physical facts about the p-zombies' brains, and that wouldn't tell you about there subjective experience (because they have none)
4.) There is a possible world where physical facts don't equal mental facts (since you could learn the physical facts about the p-zombies' brains, and that wouldn't tell you about their subjective experience)
5.) Conclusion: Mental facts and physical facts are not identical (since if they were, they'd be identical in all possible worlds given Leibniz Law. bam.)

Oh wait. There's more.

Let's consider the fact that there are some animals that can perceive ranges of light we cannot. We must use machines to do it-the machines capture the light (infared, for example), and convert it into a color we can see. However, try imagining a color you can't perceive. Oh wait, you can't. My AP Bio teacher was talking about her sister (or someone she knew) who can look at two apparently red sheets of paper. Her sister can perceive the different shades of red present in those paper sheets, whereas to us, it would just look like the same color. You could learn all the facts about how a bird's brain is processing a particular range of light we can't see, and still not know what the bird is seeing. You can learn all the physical facts about the brain of my AP Bio teacher's sister, and still not know what it's like to see those different shades of red. So check this out:

1.) You can learn all physical facts about how bird/sister's brain is processing color, and not know what they're seeing.
2.) There is something true of subjective experience that's not true of mental facts (because you could learn everything there is to learn about the physical facts, and not know the subjective experience of your subject)
Conclusion: Physical facts are not identical to mental facts via Leibniz Law.

Oh, but I'm not done yet. Consider what I said about Leibniz Mill. Nowhere in the brain chemistry will you find the subjective experience itself. You will find chemical correlates, but you won't find the experience itself. Hence:

1.) Brain chemistry exists.
2.) You will not find subjective experience in the brain chemistry (since you won't find the sensations themselves)
Conclusion: There is something true of consciousness (namely, consciousness has the property of subjective experience aka qualia) that's not true of the brain chemistry (you won't find subjective experience itself in the brain chemistry)

One more just to hammer the point home:

It is possible that this world is an idealist world. It's possible that this world emerges from consciousness-namely, what we think of as matter is really just perception. The world exists as perception + the perceiver. Again, we have no evidence that anything exists outside of perception. When we look at the world around us, we must describe the world in terms of consciousness. By this, I mean we must describe the world in terms of some sort of experience-be it color, shape, feeling, knowledge, etc. All of those are descriptions of our own experiences. And all of those are perceived in consciousness (since we're consciously aware of all of them). So let's apply this to brain chemistry. Let a particular neurological state be BS (for brain state). Let consciousness/conscious experience be MS (mental state). If BS = MS, then if the two are identical, they should have ALL things in common. Clearly, however, this is false. It's possible that idealism is true-unless anyone can prove that idealism is logically contradictory, it remains a possibility. Modal logic will be important here. Thus:

1.) It's possible that idealism is true. (it's conceivably true)
2.) There is a possible idealist world (modal logic)
3.) In a possible idealist world, matter does not exist as fundamental.
4.) In a possible idealist world, mind exists as fundamental.
Conclusion: Since there is something true of mind (can exist as fundamental in a possible idealist world) that's not true of matter (can't exist in an idealist world as fundamental), MS ain't BS. 

Remember that identity is a necessary property-that is, if A = A, it will be so in all possible worlds. But clearly, this is not the case.

And here's where I make my case for idealism, and in turn, theism.

Introspective Argument
Premise 1: The Mind exists
Justification: No one who's thinking can deny this.
Premise 2: The properties of the mind are not that which matter has.
Justification: Above arguments.
Conclusion 1: Mind is not reducible to matter-because they are not identical. The properties of the mind don't reduce to physical properties of matter. Hence, by Leibniz Law, they are not identical.
Premise 3: Substance dualism is false.
Justification: This will probably be most controversial among Christians, but I think the materialist actually knows what's up here. If, as the dualist says, there is an immaterial soul interacting with a material body, how should they interact?

Here's what I mean. We know square circles don't exist because those are logically incoherent entities-that is, squares and circles have properties that are directly opposed. They could never be joined together as one shape. How can something that's fundamentally immaterial interact with something material? They would just go through each other. Thus, if the soul is immaterial, how could it ever interact with a material body?

Interaction requires that the two things interacting share a common property. But if the immaterial soul (i.e consciousness) shares a common property with matter, then they can't be two separate substances. Either mind shares a physical property with matter, making mind physical, or matter shares a mental property with mind, making matter actually mental. The common property can't be a combination of matter and mind, because otherwise, you have the same interaction problem arising. Thus, either everything has to be mind, or everything has to be matter. There is no middle ground.

But if we've already established that the mind exists, and mind is not reducible to non-mind, then mind is a non-physical entity. However, if substance dualism is false, then no other substance can exist. Mind wouldn't be able to interact with any other substance...yet it clearly interacts with our bodies. Hence, the conclusion follows:
ALL IS MIND.

Idealism is true. This leads us to accept one of two conclusions.
SolipsismSolipsism is the view that only your mind exists and everything is a projection of it. But there's a strong defeater for solipsism. For one, if this world were really a projection of my mind, the moment I become aware of that possibility, I should be able to manipulate it (ever had a lucid dream?).There's an even stronger defeater though. If this world were a projection of my consciousness, then the external world (that is, the environment external to me) is built of my consciousness. The consciousness that exists "out there" is self-reflexive. That is, it exists with respect to me. However, any consciousness that exists with respect to me (to my own self), must be self-conscious. It is, after all, my consciousness. Then the obvious question arises: how can I be unconscious of my own consciousness? The consciousness in the environment must be self-conscious, since it only exists with respect to the self. So I should be omniscient if solipsism were true. I cannot be unconscious of something that is allegedly part of my own consciousness. That's a contradiction in terms. Hence, we are left with only one other alternative.
Theistic Idealism
One of the obvious questions asked of idealists is this: if the world truly exists as fundamentally mental, why can't I manipulate it by just thinking of it? Easy. This world isn't solely my consciousness. The alternative to solipsism is this: this world exists in a much larger mind, and we're all projections of that mind. This Mind we can call "God". Therefore, the reason I can't manipulate the structure of the world is because God Himself-the much larger Mind-is in control of the structure of the experience. We are His creations-thus, we exist in the environment He Himself has projected with His mind. Given that the premises of the Introspective Argument are self-evidently true, and solipsism is self-evidently false, we are left with no other alternative. Given how consciousness cannot be identical to brain chemistry via Leibniz Law, we are left with the conclusion that there is a much larger Mind that contains our minds. This has exciting implications for theology, philosophy-man, how you live your life in general. I will flesh those out later. This post is meant to be an introduction to idealism, and the reasons that led me to accept it over substance dualism. For anyone who cared enough to read, I hope you got a lot out of this argument. I will link some helpful resources for further investigation. Thanks for reading! :)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4l1lQMCOguw
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oBsI_ay8K70&list=UU5qDet6sa6rODi7t6wfpg8g

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=720zEnzgTyM

The first two may be really helpful. For scientific evidence from quantum mechanics, see here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4C5pq7W5yRM

Conclusion
Barbosa-and all people-have desires. Yet those desires tell us something very interesting about the nature of reality. It's true that our consciousness and the brain chemistry are linked-brain states affect mental states. However, it's equally true that our sense of "self" does not reduce to the brain chemistry...the desires and emotions we have, while correlated to the grey stuff, does not reduce to it. And hence, idealism follows from the above argument. We live through a Mind much bigger than our own. We live through God.